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ABSTRACT
COVID-19 has demonstrated that most countries’ public 
health systems and capacities are insufficiently prepared 
to prevent a localised infectious disease outbreak from 
spreading. Strengthening national preparedness requires 
National Public Health Institutes (NPHIs), or their equivalent, 
to overcome practical challenges affecting timely access 
to, and use of, data that is critical to preparedness. Our 
situational analysis in collaboration with NPHIs in three 
countries—Ethiopia, Nigeria and Pakistan—characterises 
these challenges. Our findings indicate that NPHIs’ role 
necessitates collection and analysis of data from multiple 
sources that do not routinely share data with public health 
authorities. Since initiating requests for access to new data 
sources can be a lengthy process, it is essential that NPHIs 
are routinely monitoring a broad set of priority indicators 
that are selected to reflect the country- specific context. 
NPHIs must also have the authority to be able to request 
rapid sharing of data from public and private sector 
organisations during health emergencies and to access 
additional human and financial resources during disease 
outbreaks. Finally, timely, transparent and informative 
communication of synthesised data from NPHIs will 
facilitate sustained data sharing with NPHIs from external 
organisations. These actions identified by our analysis will 
support the availability of robust information systems that 
allow relevant data to be collected, shared and analysed by 
NPHIs sufficiently rapidly to inform a timely local response 
to infectious disease outbreaks in the future.
COVID-19 AND THE NEED TO RE-EXAMINE 
PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVES
COVID-19 has shown how crippling the 
human and economic impacts of an infectious 
disease outbreak can be and demonstrated 
the extent to which global travel makes all 
countries susceptible to the rapid spread of 
pathogens.1 Even countries with substantial 
resources to protect their populations have 
been greatly affected.2 It is clear that our 
public health systems and capacities remain 
insufficiently prepared to prevent a local-
ised outbreak from becoming a pandemic. 
Emerging infectious disease outbreaks are 
occurring frequently and there is now an 
undeniable urgency to improve preparedness 
before the next one strikes.3
It is understandable that those who have 
been working in the global health security 
domain, which refers to activities aimed at 
addressing transnational acute public health 
threats, are frustrated that their efforts to ring 
alarm bells about pandemic risk have not been 
given due attention.4 However, despite much 
room for improvement in the current global 
response to infectious disease outbreaks, 
there has been notable progress since the 
SARS- CoV-1 epidemic in 2003.5 This includes 
adoption of the revised International Health 
Regulations (IHR),6 which are legally binding 
regulations (although lacking an enforce-
ment mechanism) obligating governments to 
notify the WHO of events that may constitute 
Summary box
 ► Effective access to, and use of, data by National 
Public Health Institutes (NPHIs) or their equivalent 
is a critical building block of national preparedness.
 ► To enhance NPHI functioning, it is essential that 
they are routinely monitoring a broad set of priority 
indicators that are selected to reflect the country- 
specific context.
 ► NPHIs must also have the authority to be able to 
request quick sharing of data to and from pub-
lic and private sector organisations during health 
emergencies since initiating lengthy processes to 
request data access after an outbreak has started 
results in substantial delays in outbreak detection 
and reporting.
 ► In light of the massive health and economic impacts 
of the COVID-19 pandemic, there must be concert-
ed efforts to improve timely and transparent access 
of national governments and international agencies 
to information about localised infectious disease 
outbreaks.
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a public health emergency of international concern,7 
which China did for COVID-19 on 31 December 2019.
The IHR, with 196 countries as signatories, represent a 
global agreement to work together to strengthen global 
health security. The IHR recognise the potential impact 
of infectious disease outbreaks on travel and trade and 
are intended to ensure that the response to outbreaks 
is proportionate to the level of risk they present, aiming 
to support effective action, while minimising wider 
economic impact. For COVID-19, the impact on travel 
and trade is already evident with the estimated costs 
running to trillions of dollars.8 Ebola, SARS and Zika 
also had substantial economic impacts linked to travel 
and trade restrictions.9–11 The World Bank estimates that 
affected West African countries lost US$6.8 billion in 
gross domestic product as a result of the Ebola outbreak, 
and even sub- Saharan African countries that did not 
experience Ebola cases lost US$550 million.12
STRENGTHENING NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
PREPAREDNESS
In terms of identifying who should coordinate the IHR 
capacity assessments at a national level, the IHR stipulates 
the creation of a National Focal Point, often sitting in the 
Ministry of Health or, where they are established, in the 
National Public Health Institute (NPHI). There has been 
widespread support for the formation and strengthening 
of NPHIs in all countries to provide focused, centralised 
leadership and coordination for preparedness, both in 
terms of national responses and coordination with inter-
national agencies.13 14 Currently, there are NPHIs in 99 
countries, and these typically work with National Minis-
tries of Health with varying degrees of autonomy.15 Of 38 
NPHIs who responded to a survey about their roles, 19 
indicated that they were the IHR National Focal Point (N 
Squires, personal communication, 2020).
Strengthening national accountability for prepared-
ness for global health security at the national level 
requires the clear allocation of a mandate for the role 
and appropriate institutional links and authority of 
NPHIs to collect and collate the relevant information 
to inform preparedness assessment. While the IHR and 
Joint External Evaluation (JEE) process (for more detail 
see box 1) provide a robust framework for assessing 
preparedness, appropriate and accurate metrics and 
access to the data to allow measurement are often not 
available. Analyses conducted by Chatham House and 
The Graduate Institute also identified that there are 
potential gaps in what the IHR framework covers—such 
as knowledge sharing during a public health emergency. 
The current debate between the USA and WHO about 
the sharing of COVID-19 information by China suggests 
that additional indicators might be needed as part of IHR 
assessments.16 17
For NPHIs, or their equivalent, to function effec-
tively in support of IHR compliance strengthening, 
it is necessary to understand whether they have the 
mandate, cross- sectoral reach and access to data to track 
preparedness. At its annual meeting in 2017, the Inter-
national Association of National Public Health Institutes 
(IANPHI) agreed that assessing the ability of NPHIs to 
assess preparedness would be a useful exercise to inform 
its membership of the strengths and weaknesses of 
current approaches.18
DATA SHARING WITH NPHIS AS A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF 
PREPAREDNESS
Preparedness encompasses the knowledge, capacities and 
systems to effectively anticipate, respond to and recover 
from the impacts of likely, imminent, emerging or current 
Box 1 Initiatives to monitor preparedness
In 2016, following the Ebola outbreak, the WHO, in collaboration with 
the US- lead Global Health Security Agenda, introduced a Joint 
External Evaluation (JEE) process to evaluate IHR capacities every 
5 years and develop action plans to address identified weaknesses. 
The JEE assessments are based on national and international subject 
experts reviewing self- reported data, followed by a country visit 
to agree on scoring on 19 technical areas. The success of the JEE 
process is in large part based on its development as a tool to inform 
national level preparedness—making risks clear to national policy 
makers so that they can invest appropriately to minimise risk. As of 
May 2020, 110 countries have completed the JEE process.29
The premise of JEEs is that countries’ self- assessments track 
their own progress over time by establishing a national baseline for 
assessing subsequent improvement. However, concern has been 
expressed that JEE scoring has been inappropriately used to make 
comparisons between countries, out of context, at times leading to 
ill- informed and potentially misleading inferences. There is also the 
perception that published JEE scores have resulted in the naming 
and shaming of countries with lower scores, often entirely without 
merit. For example, the Global Health Security Index, which scores 
195 countries’ capacity to face infectious disease outbreaks, in part 
based on JEE assessments, ranks the USA in first place and Singapore 
at 24/195,24 when the latter has had a much stronger and successful 
response to COVID-19.3
Figure 1 Some of the diverse sources of data that 
National Public Health Institutes may need to access for 
preparedness (horizontal bars) and complexities that need to 
be considered when accessing the data (vertical arrows).
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health emergencies.19 Effective access to, and use of, data 
by NPHIs is a critical building block of preparedness.20 
This allows NPHIs to carry out their essential functions 
including detecting unusual spikes in illnesses early, 
assessing which ports of entry might need interventions 
and communicating information to relevant professionals 
and the public. Although there are now several tools that 
monitor and evaluate progress toward global health secu-
rity and health systems strengthening—including the JEEs, 
the Sustainable Development Goals and the Performance 
of Veterinary Services tool—there are significant challenges 
to overcome for NPHIs to have timely access to data that 
they do not own (figure 1). On a technical level, access to 
data held by other organisations requires engagement of 
NPHI officials, usually trained in human healthcare or labo-
ratory sciences, with managers working in sectors that are 
disconnected from human health, and it entails constant 
negotiation, management and drafting of agreements. On 
a political level, information about the number of infectious 
disease cases in a country or the route by which people have 
been infected can have huge economic and ethical conse-
quences. It is perhaps unsurprising then that access to, and 
use of, existing sources of data that can provide valuable 
information for preparedness is suboptimal. We present 
results of our systematic, multicountry analysis of barriers 
to optimal access to, and use of, data for preparedness by 
NPHIs (box 2).
PRIORITY INDICATORS IDENTIFIED THAT NPHIS SHOULD BE 
ACCESSING FOR IMPROVED PREPAREDNESS
Analysis of priority indicators considered essential to 
monitor preparedness (see box 3 for details about the 
systematic approach used to identify indicators) identi-
fied two main findings: (1) the majority of priority indica-
tors that local experts considered essential to monitoring 
preparedness are not routinely accessed by NPHIs; (2) 
priority indicators identified by experts differ signifi-
cantly between countries, with limited overlap, as iden-
tified indicators reflected country- specific risk factors for 
infectious disease emergence or spread.
In all three countries, it was agreed that NPHIs should 
have better access to data on:
1. Timeliness of reporting of disease information by sub-
national units such as states or provinces.
2. Subnational units’ ability to respond to disease out-
break or disaster events.
3. The availability or functionality of an e- surveillance or 
online reporting mechanism at the subnational level.
4. The percentage of private healthcare facilities or pri-
vate laboratories that report into a government infor-
mation system.
CHALLENGES WITH TIMELY ACCESS TO PRIORITY INDICATOR 
DATA
Our simulation exercise- based assessment revealed that 
there could be long delays in accessing data on priority 
indicators to detect or respond to an outbreak. NPHI 
staff typically have multiple roles, and finding appro-
priate staff able to dedicate time to routinely collecting 
data from a range of organisations—although consid-
ered important—was challenging.
Data collection can take considerable time; even with 
good country commitment to the collection process, it 
sometimes took 3–6 weeks to access indicator data that 
was not already held by NPHIs. A large component of this 
delay was due to lack of clarity on which external agen-
cies hold priority indicator data and who is responsible 
for authorising data sharing. NPHIs typically do not have 
the authority to oblige external organisations to share 
their data, even in the case of an emergency. National 
agencies (such as vertical disease control programmes 
and port authorities) and international agencies (such 
as the WHO and Food and Agricultural Organization) 
require different levels of formal requests before they can 
share data with NPHIs.
Box 2 Objectives and methods of our analysis
The Strengthening National Accountability for Preparedness and 
Global Health Security project (SNAP- GHS)30 is the first multicountry 
systematic investigation of barriers faced by National Public Health 
Institutes (NPHIs) at three sequential stages:
1. Access relevant existing data within an appropriate timeframe;
2. Analyse, interpret and present data in a policy- relevant manner;
3. Initiate Action through established mechanisms of communication 
and response activities.
We conducted a collaborative study with NPHIs in Ethiopia, Nigeria 
and Pakistan and identified urgent actions for all countries to consider 
for mitigation of the continued risk from emerging infectious diseases. 
Adapting an established rapid situational analysis methodology,31 
each NPHI’s ability and capacity to Access, Analyse and initiate 
Action on data were assessed through triangulation of insights from 
a Delphi- structured Indicator prioritisation workshop, key informant 
interviews, a simulation exercise in which NPHIs attempted to collect 
data on priority indicators for improving their preparedness (see box 3) 
and a review of national legislation and other relevant documentation 
on health security and preparedness.
Box 3 Approach used to identify priority indicators for 
preparedness from existing data
The Indicator Prioritisation Workshop held in each country involved 
25–40 data experts from within and outside of the National Public 
Health Institute (NPHI). External experts represented port health 
authorities, private diagnostic laboratories, animal health agencies, 
non- governmental agencies working on cross- border issues, 
government statistics officers and the military. Applying an adapted 
Delphi methodology (publication forthcoming), participants worked 
through a list of approximately 100 individual indicators as part of 
a group of 6 to 8 and scored each one in terms of its importance 
for the NPHI to routinely monitor for preparedness. At the end of the 
workshop, 14–16 of the highest scoring indicators for preparedness 
were agreed on by the group as ‘priority indicators’. This methodology 
is detailed in a forthcoming publication, and the priority indicators 
selected by each country are summarised below in table 1.
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Table 1 Summary of priority indicators selected by each country
Prioritised indicators
Ethiopia
1 Number of climate information centres established
2 Proportion of community Disaster Risk Response (DDR) committees/task force established members who have 
improved their technical capacity on Disease Risk Management (DRM) system
3 Proportion of regions that have coordination for an established and been supported in mainstreaming DRM
4 Proportion of health facilities that report health service data to government reporting system
5 Institutionalised and functional data quality assurance mechanism at (all) administrative levels
6 Yearly routine data quality assessment report that demonstrates improvement in data quality (timeliness, accuracy 
and completeness of reports) including Expanded Programme of Immunization (EPI) data
7 Proportion of health administration levels with functional Surgical Information Systems (SIS) by category (Wordea 
Health Office (WorHO), Zonal Health Department (ZHD), Regional Health Bureau (RHB))
8 Proportion of health facilities that meet the National Health Information System (HIS) infrastructure standard by 
category and ownership
9 Proportion of health Institutions with functional e- HMIS (health management information system) by category 
(Health Centre, Hospital, WorHO, ZHD, RHB)
10 HIS governance in place including e- Health
11 Legislation (approved by parliament) governing the collection, processing and dissemination of health information in 
place
12 National data repository and data warehouse
13 Proportion of reported outbreaks or rumours verified and investigated by Woreda Health Office
14 Proportion of health facilities submitting daily or weekly surveillance reports on time to the district
15 Number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) for climate- induced reasons
16 Livestock vaccinations among households who own livestock by place of residence
Nigeria
1 Percentage of Local Government Areas (LGAs) that submit timely monthly surveillance reports
2 Proportion of healthcare workers trained/sensitised on Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) in the 
preceding year
3 Percentage of deaths due to notifiable communicable diseases
4 Yellow fever immunisation coverage
5 Percentage of states that timely submit disease surveillance reports
6 Full immunisation coverage
7 Maternal mortality rate
8 Percentage of private health providers participating in the Nigeria HMIS
9 (a) Community health extension workers (CHEWs) and (b) Junior CHEWs density per 10 000 population
10 Percentage of outbreak alerts investigated within 48 hours
11 Proportion of healthcare facilities with basic water supply
12 Percentage of health facilities that provide minimum health package
13 Percentage of federal budget allocated to the health sector
14 Percentage of state budget allocated to the health sector
Pakistan
1 Percentage of districts submitting online routine monthly reports to provinces, within agreed timelines
2 Percentage of reporting units achieving satisfactory Data Quality Assurance (DQAS) score/mark increased
3 Percentage of vertical programmes integrated with provincial MIS Cell
4 Percentage of private sector hospitals and healthcare facilities regularly reporting using Pakistan Health Information 
System (PHIS)
5 Number of districts preparing annual health plans of actions considering the health issues emerging from the 
information system
Continued
Khan MS, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e002830. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002830 5
BMJ Global Health
Limitations in the coverage, accuracy, timeliness and 
completeness of electronic data collection systems are a 
further challenge. Lack of mechanisms for receiving data 
from private healthcare providers, which often greatly 
outnumber government healthcare facilities, is also a 
widespread issue. Variations in the strength of infectious 
disease reporting systems across states or districts, as well 
as notable differences in capacity for data management 
across regions, mean that there is variability in quality, 
completeness and timeliness of reporting from subna-
tional units. Thus, if an outbreak originates in a district 
with limited capacity to detect and report cases to the 
NPHI in a timely manner, this will impede appropriate 
action at a national level and delay reporting to the WHO 
under IHR.
Finally, substantial human resource engagement is 
required to gather data on priority indicators. This 
includes junior and mid- level staff from NPHIs to conduct 
visits or calls to organisations that own the priority indi-
cator data and several hours of senior staff time to arrange 
formal data request letters and ensure that protocols for 
contacting external agencies are in place.
CONCERNS ABOUT USE OF DATA BY NPHIS
For accessing data from agencies working outside of 
public health—such as animal health agencies, airports 
and statistics departments—having a clearly defined and 
formally endorsed mandate for the NPHI is helpful in 
initiating a discussion on data sharing. A lack of clarity 
about how data will be used can be a deterrent to data 
sharing. This could be addressed by a two- way commit-
ment for timely data sharing to be matched by prompt 
analysis and feedback. There is a particular challenge 
collecting data from private sector organisations, such as 
commercial diagnostic laboratories and airlines, which 
are conscious that compiling and sharing data have a cost 
that needs to be justified in terms of understanding how 
the data will be used and of any resulting benefits from 
the data generated. Data sharing may also be resisted 
because of the risk of highlighting weaknesses in data 
quality or, in the case of private sector providers, because 
insights from the data about levels of activity may be 
considered commercially or financially sensitive. Some of 
these concerns will be addressed if the NPHI has a strong 
reputation and a clear mandate for data collection and 
analysis in the national interest, which requires transpar-
ency over how data will be used to enhance preparedness.
Timeliness of data analysis by NPHIs is a key determi-
nant in willingness of organisations to share priority indi-
cator data. Overall, there is a demand for more insights 
and recommendations from NPHIs when there is a 
disease outbreak rather than just information on numbers 
of new cases; such real- time analysis and syntheses of 
data require substantial resources and experienced 
data analysts within NPHIs, especially during outbreak 
periods when resources are stretched. The dependence 
of some NPHIs on international technical agencies for 
support on sophisticated analysis of data for prepared-
ness may be problematic. Another common challenge is 
generating analysis that is useful for agencies working in 
animal health and presenting recommendations that are 
relevant to private sector organisations such as hotels and 
hospitals; NPHIs were expected to produce materials that 
were tailored not only to public health bodies but to a 
range of sectors.
CONCLUSION
The current COVID-19 health emergency serves as a 
glaring reminder of how essential it is to have effective 
subnational and national data sharing systems to support 
preparedness, as local actions directly affect the magni-
tude of health and economic impacts globally. At the 
start of the COVID-19 outbreak in China, for example, 
critical delays in local officials notifying national author-
ities may have led to the proliferation of cases and inde-
pendent chains of transmission.21 Delays in NPHIs, and 
therefore national governments and international public 
health agencies, accessing relevant information about 
Prioritised indicators
6 Is there a policy or strategy that makes specific reference to social media use in the health domain?
7 Is there a national policy or strategy on the use of social media by government organisations?
8 Is there a national Electronic Health Record (EHR) system?
9 Percentage of primary care facilities with EHR
10 Is there a National Laboratory Information System?
11 Is there a National Pathology Information System?
12 Total agricultural exports (US$)
13 Statistical Capacity Indicator (composite score assessing the capacity of a country’s statistical system)
14 Percentage of districts with their recognised surveillance sites having functional online surveillance for vaccine 
preventable diseases
15 Number of individuals returning from Provinces of Pakistan
16 Number of internally displaced persons
Table 1 Continued
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infectious disease outbreaks can result in substantial 
morbidity and mortality globally—and yet we have not 
acted to address these delays.22 Furthermore, there are 
already discussions about whether the resources being 
mobilised for COVID-19 will be wasted because the capac-
ities are not in place in countries to build and implement 
evidence- based response strategies; continued failure 
to strengthen national public health response mecha-
nisms such as those coordinated by NPHIs may therefore 
impede resource generation.23
It has been argued that there is a need for an indepen-
dent global mechanism for monitoring preparedness,24 
and the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board was 
established by WHO, World Bank and others in 201825 
to act as an independent monitoring and advisory body. 
However, there is a danger in creating a monitoring 
mechanism that conducts global comparisons, as coun-
tries may be less willing to engage if they think it might 
be a vehicle to criticise rather than support them. Thus, 
there are advantages to avoiding international country 
comparisons and focusing on strengthening national 
accountability for preparedness by building the capacity 
of national institutions to assess preparedness using 
measures relevant to their own contexts across the full 
range of IHR competencies.26
This is the first assessment, to our knowledge, of prac-
tical challenges affecting timely access to, and use of, 
data that is critical to preparedness by NPHIs. Judging by 
the (reported) challenges experienced with timely data 
sharing for COVID-19 management in diverse settings—
from South Korea to the USA—the issues we engage with 
are salient in many countries.27 28 Our findings suggest 
that NPHIs need to urgently be equipped with the 
mandate, expertise and resources to carry out a broader 
role in preparedness. Such a role necessitates collection 
and analysis of data from multiple sources that do not 
routinely share data with public health authorities. To 
enhance NPHI functioning, it is essential that they are 
routinely monitoring a broad set of priority indicators 
that are selected to reflect the country- specific context.
NPHIs must also have the authority to be able to 
request quick sharing of data from public and private 
sector organisations during health emergencies and to 
access additional human and financial resources during 
disease outbreaks. Having a clear legal mandate that 
supports the role of NPHIs is critical, since personal rela-
tionships and individual leadership cannot be relied on 
in the long- term. Initiating a lengthy, formal process to 
request data sharing after an outbreak has started could 
result in unacceptable delays.
Preparedness at a national level, which is critical to 
prevent future pandemics, is dependent on the avail-
ability of robust information systems that allow relevant 
data to be collected, shared and analysed sufficiently 
rapidly to inform a timely local response. NPHIs in 
many countries have a significant role in preparedness, 
detection and response but may lack a sufficiently strong 
mandate to collect all the data from outside of human 
health that is needed for monitoring preparedness. 
Through our situational analysis, we identified steps that 
could be taken to support the important role of NPHIs in 
national preparedness (box 4).
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